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OPINION 
                
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
 
 In this appeal of a personal injury action arising out 
of injuries caused by an allegedly defective tractor, we are 
asked to decide whether the district court erred: (1) in allowing 
plaintiffs to introduce evidence concerning a history of tractor 
rollovers when the accident at issue did not involve a tractor 
rollover, and (2) in denying defendant's motion for judgment as a 
matter of law and allowing plaintiff's strict liability case to 
reach the jury.  We conclude that the district court did not err 
in denying the defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law 
and in allowing this case to proceed to the jury.  However, 
because the district court did err in admitting irrelevant 
evidence and because that evidentiary error was not harmless, we 
will vacate the judgment of the district court and remand to the 
district court for retrial.  
 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 On September 21, 1989, plaintiff David Barker 
("Barker")0 was operating his John Deere Model 620 ("Deere 620") 
tractor while working on his farm in Slippery Rock, Pennsylvania. 
                     
0Christina Barker, David's wife, was also a party in the suit, 
claiming damages for past and future loss of services, 
companionship, and consortium.  For purposes of this appeal, both 
David and Christina Barker will be referred to collectively as 
"Barker," unless it is necessary to distinguish between the two. 
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He was using the tractor to tow several large logs from a lower 
field to his farmhouse to be split and chopped for firewood.  He 
hauled the logs by backing the tractor up to the log, securing 
the log to the tractor using a 15 foot chain which was attached 
to the tractor's drawbar, and then putting the tractor in forward 
gear to drag the log.  Barker completed several successful trips, 
and then backed the tractor to a log that was 16 to 18 inches in 
diameter and 20 feet long.  After his stepfather hooked the log, 
Barker turned forward, and began to tow the log.  At this point, 
the front end of the log became stuck in the ground, causing the 
rear end of the log to rise in the air and flip over in a pole-
vault type fashion, striking Barker from behind on his left 
shoulder.  Barker was ejected from his seat and thrown to the 
ground where he was then run over by the tractor.  As a result of 
the accident, he suffered serious injuries including broken ribs, 
punctured lungs, a broken leg, and injuries to his back and 
shoulder. 
 Barker filed a complaint on August 19, 1991, and 
thereafter an amended complaint in the United States District 
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania against Deere and 
Company ("Deere").  He alleged inter alia, that the Deere 620 
tractor0 was defective because at the time of manufacture it 
lacked an operator protective system ("OPS") to protect him from 
                     
0During the mid-to-late 1950's, Deere designed and produced the 
John Deere 600 line of tractors, including the Deere 620 tractor.  
This model was produced from 1956 until 1958 and was designed 
primarily for agricultural use.  The Deere 620 did not come 
equipped with a structure to protect the operator from tractor 
rollovers, or from falling objects.  
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objects which intruded into the operator area, and because Deere 
later failed to retrofit the tractor with such a system.0  App. 
at 43-44.  The case was tried before a jury.  At the close of 
Barker's case and again at the close of all the evidence, Deere 
moved pursuant to Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
for judgment as a matter of law, relying on Azzarello v. Black 
Bros. Co., 480 Pa. 547, 391 A.2d 1020 (1978), and Fitzpatrick v. 
Madonna, 424 Pa. Super. 473, 623 A.2d 322 (1993).  These cases 
explain that the trial judge is initially responsible for 
determining whether a strict products liability case should be 
submitted to the jury.  The district court denied Deere's motion 
on both occasions. 
 The jury concluded that the Deere 620 tractor was 
defective and that the defect was a substantial factor in causing 
Barker's injuries.  It returned an award of damages in the amount 
of $317,753.00 to David Barker but awarded no damages to 
Christina Barker for loss of consortium.  After the verdict was 
entered, Deere filed a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59 
                     
0In a typical products liability action in Pennsylvania, a 
plaintiff must show: (1) the product was defective; (2) the 
defect existed while the product was in the control of the 
manufacturer; and (3) the defect was the proximate cause of the 
injuries.  Habecker v. Clark Equipment Co., 36 F.3d 278, 284 (3d 
Cir. 1994), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 115 S. Ct. 1313 (1995), 
(citing Walton v. Avco Corp., 530 Pa. 568, 576-77, 610 A.2d 454, 
458-59 (1992)).  However, to establish a cause of action based on 
a theory of crashworthiness, the claim asserted here, a plaintiff 
must show: (1) the design of the product was defective; (2) when 
the design was made, an alternative, safer design, practicable 
under the circumstances existed; (3) what injuries, if any, the 
plaintiff would have received had the alternative, safer design, 
been used; and (4) what injuries were attributable to the 
defective design.  Habecker, 36 F.3d at 284.   
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of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and renewed its motion 
for judgment as a matter of law.  The district court denied both 
motions.  Deere appeals that order, arguing that the district 
court made several errors in ruling on the admissibility of 
evidence, and further arguing that this strict products liability 
case should not have been submitted to the jury.  
 
II. JURISDICTION 
 The district court had jurisdiction to entertain this 
matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (diversity jurisdiction).  We 
have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, which confers 
jurisdiction upon all final orders of the district courts.  
 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 We ordinarily review a trial court's decision 
concerning the admissibility of evidence under an abuse of 
discretion standard.  Glass v. Philadelphia Electric Co., 34 F.3d 
188, 191 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing In re Japanese Electronic 
Products, 723 F.2d 238, 260 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd on other 
grounds, Matsushita Electronic Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith 
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 106 S. Ct. 1348 (1986)).  Likewise, 
"we review the district court's decision to include or exclude 
evidence arising under the Federal Rules of Evidence 401, 402 and 
403 for an abuse of discretion."  Id. (citing Pfeiffer v. Marion 
Center Area Sch. Dist., 917 F.2d 779, 781-82 (3d Cir. 1990)). 
However, when this court reviews a ruling on the admissibility of 
evidence which turns on an interpretation of a Federal Rule of 
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Evidence, our review is plenary.  In Re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB 
Litigation, 35 F.3d 717, 749 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing DeLuca v. 
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 944 (3d Cir. 
1990)). 
 The question of whether a strict products liability 
case in Pennsylvania should be submitted to the jury is a 
question of law.  Fitzpatrick, 424 Pa. Super. at 475, 623 A.2d at 
324 (citing Azzarello, 480 Pa. at 558, 391 A.2d at 1026); see 
also Nowak v. Faberge USA, Inc., 32 F.3d 755, 757 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(noting that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has explicitly 
held the determination that a product is defective is initially a 
question of law to be answered by the trial judge). 
  
IV. DISCUSSION 
A.  Legal Relevance of Previous Tractor Rollovers 
 Deere contends that it was severely prejudiced at trial 
when Barker was permitted repeatedly to place into evidence facts 
and statements concerning the history of other farm accidents 
and, in particular, tractor rollovers.  Barker claims that this 
evidence was offered to prove that: (1) the Deere 620 tractor was 
defective on the theory that it did not possess an OPS to protect 
the operator from the consequences of rollovers, Appellee's brief 
at 12; and (2) the OPS was an alternative, safer design, 
practicable (or feasible) under the circumstances,0 id. -- two 
                     
0Barker offers a third justification for admission of tractor 
rollover evidence, namely it was relevant to prove that the 
placement of the OPS on the Deere 620 presented no mechanical 
incompatibility.  As noted in Habecker, 36 F.3d at 286, 
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elements which must be proven in order to succeed under a theory 
of crashworthiness.  See supra n.3.  Deere maintains that 
evidence concerning tractor rollovers, and injuries and deaths 
caused by those rollovers, was not relevant to any issue in this 
case which did not involve a tractor rollover.  
 Specifically, Deere objected to the testimony of John 
Sevart ("Sevart"), Barker's expert witness, who testified to the 
following: (1) in 1950, and increasing at a rate of 40 to 50 a 
year for the remainder of the decade, there were approximately 
640 tractor deaths to farmers; App. at 265; (2) approximately 60% 
of the fatalities were caused by rollover accidents; App. at 266; 
(3) approximately 30% of the fatalities occurred as a result of 
the operator being ejected out of the seat and run over or being 
struck by a falling object; App. at 266; and (4) for every 
operator killed during this time span, an additional 40 people 
were injured; App. at 267.  
 Rule 401 of the Federal Rules of Evidence states: 
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any 
tendency to make the existence of any fact 
that is of consequence to the determination 
of the action more probable or less probable 
than it would be without the evidence. 
Fed. R. Evid. 401.  Rule 402 of the Federal Rules of Evidence 
states in relevant part, "[e]vidence which is not relevant is not 
admissible."  Fed. R. Evid. 402.  We now turn to analysis of 
whether evidence of rollover accidents is relevant to prove: (1) 
                                                                  
"mechanical incompatibility" is an element which points to a lack 
of feasibility, and this is incorporated in Barker's second 
asserted justification for admission of evidence of rollover 
accidents.   
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a design defect; and (2) that an alternative, safer, feasible 
design existed.     
 In assessing whether evidence proffered as direct proof 
of a design defect is relevant in a products liability 
(crashworthy) case, we observe: 
In the appropriate circumstances, evidence of 
prior occurrences and accidents involving a 
product which is identical or substantially 
similar to the product which has allegedly 
caused an injury has generally been held to 
be admissible at trial.  [S]uch evidence may 
be considered by the trial court for 
admission in . . . strict liability . . . 
actions.  The almost universal requirement, 
however, is that the prior occurrence must 
involve facts and circumstances which are 
substantially similar to those involved in 
the case under consideration or they will be 
excluded. 
2A Louis Frumer & Melvin Friedman, Products Liability § 18.02[1], 
at 18-14 to 18-17 (1995) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). 
 We note that every court of appeals to have considered 
this issue agrees that when a plaintiff attempts to introduce 
evidence of other accidents as direct proof of a design defect, 
the evidence is admissible only if the proponent demonstrates 
that the accidents occurred under circumstances substantially 
similar to those at issue in the case at bar.  See Burke v. Deere 
& Co., 6 F.3d 497, 506 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 
114 S. Ct. 1063 (1994); Lockley v. Deere & Co., 933 F.2d 1378, 
1386 (8th Cir. 1991); Joy v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 999 
F.2d 549, 554 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Ross v. Black & Decker, Inc., 977 
F.2d 1178, 1185 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 113 S. 
Ct. 1274 (1993); Cooper v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 945 
9 
F.2d 1103, 1105 (9th Cir. 1991); Anderson v. Whittaker Corp., 894 
F.2d 804, 813 (6th Cir. 1990); Hessen v. Jaguar Cars, Inc., 915 
F.2d 641, 649 (11th Cir. 1990); Melton v. Deere & Co., 887 F.2d 
1241, 1245 (5th Cir. 1989); Wheeler v. John Deere Co., 862 F.2d 
1404, 1408 (10th Cir. 1988);  McKinnon v. Skil Corp., 638 F.2d 
270, 277 (1st Cir. 1981); cf. Estate of Carey v. Hy-Temp Mfg., 
Inc., 929 F.2d 1229, 1235 n.2 (7th Cir. 1991) ("[W]e caution that 
`substantially similar' does not mean `identical.'"). 
 This foundational requirement of establishing 
substantial similarity is especially important in cases where the 
evidence is proffered to show the existence of a design defect. 
See Nachtsheim v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 847 F.2d 1261, 1268-69 
(7th Cir. 1988).  In such cases, the jury is invited to infer 
from the presence of other accidents that a design defect existed 
which contributed to the plaintiffs' injuries.  See id. at 1269; 
see also C.A. Associates v. Dow Chemical Co., 918 F.2d 1485, 1489 
(10th Cir. 1990) (noting that in "a product liability action, the 
occurrence of similar accidents or failures involving the same 
product holds great relevance, since evidence of such failures 
tends to make the existence of a defect more probable than it 
would be without the evidence"). 
 We observe that the district court must be apprised of 
the specific facts of previous accidents in order to make a 
reasoned determination as to whether the prior accidents are 
"substantially similar."  Absent such a foundation, it is 
impossible for the district court in the first instance, and for 
this court on appeal, to review the facts in order to make a 
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determination as to similarity.  See Hardy v. Chemetron Corp., 
870 F.2d 1007, 1009 (5th Cir. 1989) (upholding the trial court's 
refusal to admit evidence because there was a "total lack of 
evidence on the crucial question of substantial similarity"); 
Nachtsheim, 847 F.2d at 1269 (7th Cir. 1988) ("[T]here are too 
few established facts about the [prior] accident from which a 
comparison between the two accidents can be made.") (emphasis in 
original); Lewy v. Remington Arms Co., 836 F.2d 1104, 1109 (8th 
Cir. 1988) (plaintiff's counsel "failed to lay an adequate 
foundation" to show that other evidence was similar); McKinnon, 
638 F.2d at 277 (1st Cir. 1981) ("The record is totally devoid of 
[a] showing of the circumstances under which these accidents 
occurred.") (footnote omitted). 
 Our primary concern is that Barker has not presented 
sufficient evidence which could lead the district court to 
believe that the prior accidents were in any way similar to the 
case before us.  The record contained only raw numbers and 
statistical extrapolations.  At most, we are able to discern from 
the testimony of Barker's expert witness that approximately 190 
persons (30% of 640 fatalities) were killed in tractor accidents 
as a result of being: (1) ejected from the seat; (2) run over; 
and/or (3) hit by a falling object.0  However, there are no 
documented cases of an injury/death arising from an accident with 
a Deere 620 tractor where an object entered the operator area and 
                     
0We question how the other 384 (60% of 640) fatalities that 
resulted from tractor rollover accidents are similar, let alone 
"substantially similar" to the case before us which did not 
involve a tractor rollover. 
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ejected the operator from his seat.  We hold Barker failed to 
offer sufficient evidence to prove that any prior accident is 
"substantially similar" to the accident which led to his 
injuries.0 
 Moreover, what scant evidence was admitted did not 
contain any specific information with regard to the details of 
any single accident.  All evidence of accidents where an object 
entered the operator area was presented via the National Safety 
Council statistics.  This evidence concerned tractors generally, 
not specifically John Deere tractors and not Deere 620 tractors. 
Furthermore, most of the evidence of fatalities was 
characteristic of rollovers, and we are uncertain of the 
specifics of any non-rollover accidents.  Barker was attempting 
to prove a defect in the Deere 620 tractor by submitting evidence 
of injuries/deaths and evidence of a possible defect in other 
tractors that were involved in rollover accidents.  The jury was 
invited to infer that over 500 lives per year would be saved if 
there were a rollover bar on the Deere 620 tractor.  We fail to 
comprehend how any of the prior accidents were "substantially 
similar" to the case before us.  All of the evidence of prior 
tractor accidents that was introduced as direct evidence of a 
                     
0Assuming arguendo that Barker was successful in proving that 
some of the prior accidents were "substantially similar" to his 
accident, we question how the introduction of death statistics 
was relevant.  As part of his case-in-chief, Barker was 
attempting to show the feasibility of design of the operator 
protective structure, not the need for such a device.  The 
existence of accidents and fatalities that occurred goes to prove 
the need for the protective structure, not its feasibility. 
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design defect should have been excluded as irrelevant pursuant to 
Rule 402. 
 Next, we address whether evidence of rollover accidents 
is relevant to prove that an alternative, safer, feasible design 
existed at the time of manufacture of the Deere 620 which would 
have prevented or mitigated some of Barker's injuries.  In order 
to prove this element of his claim, Barker must show that an OPS 
design existed which would provide protection against the 
recognized hazards that a tractor engages and also pose no 
additional risk to the operator.  Habecker, 36 F.3d at 284-86. 
The evidence presented at trial by Barker revealed that there 
were three recognized hazards known prior to the manufacture of 
the Deere 620: (1) injury from falling objects; (2) injury from 
ejection from the operator seat; and (3) injury from tractor 
rollovers.  Barker was thus obligated to prove that the OPS, 
which he claims would have prevented the log from hitting and 
ejecting him, would also have protected the operator in the event 
of a rollover, the most common type of tractor accident.  Stated 
differently, if Barker failed to prove that the proposed OPS did 
not protect against rollovers, as well as against intrusions into 
the operator area, then the proposed OPS would not be a safer 
design.  Evidence of tractor rollover accidents would also enable 
the jury to understand the necessity for the precise design of 
the OPS.  Thus, evidence regarding the existence of tractor 
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rollover accidents is relevant to proving one element of a 
crashworthy case.0   
 Our observation that Barker must prove that the OPS 
provides protection in the event of rollover accidents in order 
to satisfy that element of his claim does not necessarily mean 
that all of the evidence of rollover accidents introduced at 
trial was relevant.  Evidence of specific rollover accidents is 
not relevant unless it is sufficiently related to the Deere 620. 
That is, the evidence must be probative of the type of accidents 
that would have influenced the designers of the Deere 620, had 
they been designing an OPS for the Deere 620.  Instead, the 
evidence at trial dealt with all accidents on all tractors during 
the period leading up to the development of the Deere 620. Absent 
a sufficient foundation for the premise that tractor designers 
must examine accidents that affect other analogous products of 
other manufacturers, evidence of all accidents on all tractors 
during the development of the Deere 620 would not be sufficiently 
probative of whether an OPS for the Deere 620 would have had to 
protect against rollovers, as well as intrusions.  Because both 
the volume of evidence regarding rollovers and the specific 
introduction of estimated fatalities and injuries resulting from 
                     
0At a bare minimum, plaintiff must be allowed to introduce 
general evidence which indicates there are three common types of 
tractor accidents and that most accidents involving tractors were 
of the rollover type.  We do not foreclose or limit the 
plaintiff's proofs in demonstrating that the alternative, 
feasible, safer design must encompass protection against 
intrusions, as well as ejections and rollovers.  Some allusion to 
rollover accidents is necessary in plaintiff's attempt to prove 
that an alternative, feasible, safer design existed when the 
product was manufactured. 
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rollover accidents involving other tractors was not relevant to 
Barker's case, this evidence should have been excluded.0 
 
B.  Harmless Error Analysis 
 After concluding that the district court erred in 
allowing Barker to introduce evidence of unrelated tractor 
accidents, we must next inquire whether "it is highly probable 
that the error did not affect the outcome of the case."  Lockhart 
v. Westinghouse Credit Corp., 879 F.2d 43, 53 (3d Cir. 1989); see 
McQueeney v. Wilmington Trust Co., 779 F.2d 916, 924, 927-28 (3d 
Cir. 1985).  We have explained that a non-constitutional error in 
a civil case is harmless "unless a substantial right of the party 
is affected."  Linkstrom v. Golden T. Farms, 883 F.2d 269, 269 
(3d Cir. 1989) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 103(a)).  We believe that 
the error did affect the jury's verdict, and thus we are unable 
to conclude that it is highly probable that the error did not 
affect the outcome of the case. 
 First, we note that the only question submitted to the 
court by the jury during its deliberations revolved around the 
very evidence that we earlier concluded should not have been 
admitted.0   The fact that the jury requested the accident 
                     
0Alternatively, Deere argues that even assuming arguendo that the 
evidence was relevant, the district court should have excluded 
the evidence pursuant to Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence because of the "danger of unfair prejudice."  Fed. R. 
Evid. 403.  Because we conclude that the evidence was not 
relevant and thus should not have been admitted pursuant to Rule 
402, we need not decide whether Rule 403 would warrant the 
exclusion of this evidence.  
0The jury sent the following question to the judge, "Are we going 
to have any of the other research available to us, e.g., accident 
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statistics indicates that it was concentrating on this evidence 
and demonstrates that the court's error in allowing this evidence 
was not harmless.  Second, our conclusion is further supported by 
the fact that Barker's opening statement and closing argument 
contained references to tractor rollovers and other accidents 
which were not similar to the incident in which Barker was 
injured.  To the extent that Sevart's testimony regarding prior 
accidents should not have been admitted, it was improper for 
Barker's counsel to comment on that evidence.0  Finally, we are 
also troubled by additional inflammatory comments made by Barker 
                                                                  
statistics, studies on early ROPS [Rollover Protective Systems], 
etc."  App. at 806. 
0Barker commented on Mr. Sevart's testimony as follows: 
 
The evidence will show you that operator protection 
systems, such as that [] we're going to show you, would 
save in excess of 500 lives a year.  That's 500 lives a 
year for as long back as [Deere] would have put them 
on.  
 
App. at 183. 
 
Mr. Sevart testified that in 1950, according to the 
National Safety Council, which their expert has deemed 
to be an authoritative source on statistics, 640 people 
were killed on tractors.  Of those 640 people, 90 
percent were killed either by being ejected off the 
tractor, being struck by a falling object, or being 
hit, hurt in a tractor rollover. 
 Now, of that, 576 individuals, Mr. Sevart said 
one-third of that, 576 -- those 576 people were, 190 
people were killed as a result of ejectment out of the 
seat, being run over or falling objects.  [5]76 people 
per year in 1950, with the rate going up at a rate of, 
I believe he said 40 or 45 additional persons per year. 
In addition to those statistics from the National 
Safety Council, for every one reported fatality, there 
are 40 injuries. 
 
App. at 733. 
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during opening statements and closing arguments regarding Deere's 
alleged inaction in the face of documented injuries/deaths.0  We 
conclude that the district court erred in admitting irrelevant 
evidence of previous tractor rollover accidents, and that the 
error was not harmless. 
 
C. Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law   
 Deere maintains that under the teaching of Azzarello, 
480 Pa. at 558, 391 A.2d at 1026, as followed by later cases 
                     
0Barker commented as follows: 
 
The evidence will show that in 1956, the first year 
that this tractor was manufactured, a Model 620 
agricultural tractor, Deere had known for 30 years that 
hundreds of farmers were being killed, maimed and 
crippled throughout the United States and the rest of 
the industrialized world due to farm accidents. 
 
App. at 179 (emphasis added). 
 
These things are killing people needlessly.  People 
were being crushed, paralyzed and killed across the 
country needlessly.  What did [Deere] do in 1950?  Hear 
no evil, see no evil.  That's what [Deere] did. [Deere] 
did nothing.  The evidence is conclusive that in spite 
of this problem in 1950, Deere did nothing. 
 
App. at 735 (emphasis added). 
 
[Y]ou're allowing [Deere] to get away with murdering 
and injuring people . . . .  
 
App. at 756 (emphasis added).  Although opening statements and 
closing arguments are not "evidence," we are mindful of the 
effect that the following statements may have had on the jury.   
We pause here to comment that, aside from the fact that these 
comments were founded on irrelevant and inadmissible evidence, 
these remarks were inappropriate and inflammatory.  Even though 
the objection to "get away with murder[]" was sustained, the 
statistical evidence on which the accusation was premised was 
nonetheless admitted during the trial. 
17 
including Fitzpatrick, 424 Pa. Super. at 475, 623 A.2d at 324, 
this strict products liability case should not have been 
submitted to the jury.  Deere argues that the district court 
should have entered judgment as a matter of law in its favor, 
since there was no evidence that a suitable protective structure 
of the type advocated by plaintiffs existed at the time the 
subject tractor was designed, manufactured, and under Deere's 
control.  Deere concedes that evidence of the non-existence of a 
safety device may not be properly considered by a jury, but 
maintains that this evidence bears directly on the trial judge's 
threshold determination of whether the case should even be 
submitted to the jury.  Finally, Deere contends that to hold it 
liable for failure to put an OPS on the Deere 620 at least ten 
years before a practical OPS became available, in effect imposes 
a duty to invent on manufacturers.     
 In Azzarello, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held 
that in a strict product liability action, before the case can be 
placed before the jury, the trial judge must make a threshold 
legal determination whether the defect alleged, if proven, would 
render the product "unreasonably dangerous" as the term is 
defined in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A.  Azzarello, 
480 Pa. at 558, 391 A.2d at 1026.  The court further stated, 
"[i]t is a judicial function to decide whether, under plaintiff's 
averment of the facts, recovery would be justified; and only 
after this judicial determination is made is the cause submitted 
to the jury to determine whether the facts of the case support 
the averments of the complaint."  Id. at 558, 391 A.2d at 1026. 
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Recently, another Pennsylvania court in applying Azzarello added 
the following: 
[T]he initial issue . . . is a question of 
law whose resolution depends upon social 
policy . . . .  [I]n making a product 
liability social policy analysis, a court 
must possess the qualities of both a social 
philosopher and a risk-utility economic 
analyst.  The court in such cases must 
balance the utility of the product against 
the seriousness and likelihood of injury and 
the availability of precautions that, though 
not foolproof, might prevent the injury. 
Fitzpatrick, 424 Pa. Super. at 475-76, 623 A.2d at 324 (citations 
and internal quotation marks omitted).  Furthermore, the court in 
Fitzpatrick observed that factors to be considered when 
undertaking this analysis include:  "[1] the gravity of the 
danger posed by the challenged design; [2] the likelihood that 
such danger would occur; [3] the mechanical feasibility of a 
safer design; [4] the financial cost of a safer design; and [5] 
the adverse consequences to the product that would result from a 
safer design."  Id. at 476, 623 A.2d at 324 (quoting Dambacher by 
Dambacher v. Mallis, 336 Pa. Super. 22, 50 n.5, 485 A.2d 408, 423 
n.5 (Pa. Super. 1984) (citing Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., 20 
Cal.3d 413, 431, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 237, 573 P.2d 443, 455 
(1978))). 
 Sevart testified that OPS's were first developed for 
the logging industry prior to 1940 in order to provide protection 
from falling objects.  He further explained that prior to 1956, 
steel and welding techniques existed which could be used to 
produce an OPS.  Additionally, Sevart testified that such an OPS 
would not interfere with the utilization of the Deere 620 tractor 
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and would accommodate 99 percent of all farm implements that 
could be used with the Deere 620.  Finally, he stated that the 
cost of manufacturing and installing an OPS in 1955 would have 
been approximately $150.00 per tractor. 
 Deere's expert testified that an OPS was not available 
until the 1960's and, even then, incompatibility with existing 
tractors was a major problem.  Deere maintains that there was 
ample testimony presented at trial which indicated that the 
placement of an OPS was not feasible because it would interfere 
with tractor controls and farming implements.  Additionally, 
Deere claims that the likelihood of another accident similar to 
this one is "infinitesimal" as manifest by Barker's failure to 
present evidence of any similar accident. 
 When deciding whether to submit the "issue of defect to 
a jury, the court must first view the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiff to determine if a defect may be 
found."  Burch v. Sear, Roebuck and Co., 320 Pa. Super. 444, 450-
451, 467 A.2d 615, 618-19 (Pa. Super. 1983) (citing Azzarello). 
Examining the factors as listed in Fitzpatrick, we observe that 
Barker proffered to the district court that:  (1) a tractor 
without an OPS posed a danger to the operator; (2) it was not 
uncommon for such a danger to occur; (3) the OPS was feasible; 
(4) the cost was reasonable; and (5) the OPS would not be 
incompatible with the tractor controls or its implements.  After 
reviewing the evidence in the instant case, we are satisfied the 
district court did not err in submitting this case to the jury. 
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 In so holding, we reject Deere's argument that a 
district court, during its threshold determination, may consider 
the nonexistence of a safety device as evidence of its 
nonfeasibility.  Recently, in Habecker v. Clark Equipment Co., 36 
F.3d 278 (3d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 115 S. Ct. 
1313 (1995), a strict product liability (crashworthiness) case 
involving a forklift, this Court was asked to decide a similar 
issue.  In that case, the defense expert testified that at the 
time of the manufacture of the forklift in 1977, there was no 
acceptable operator restraint system ("ORS") that could have been 
put on the forklift because the ORS was not developed until 1983 
and patented until 1986.  Id. at 284-85.  We held that an attempt 
to show that an ORS developed in 1983 was not in existence in 
1977, and therefore not feasible, was "unequivocally 
impermissible in a Pennsylvania products liability trial."  Id. 
at 285.  We stated three more times in Habecker that evidence of 
the non-existence of a safety feature could not be introduced to 
suggest that the device was not feasible at the earlier date. See 
id. at 286 ("The fact that the 1983 ORS did not exist in 1977 . . 
. does not mean that it was incapable of being placed on the 
[forklift] in 1977 if it did in fact exist."); id. (like 
feasibility, the "practicable under the circumstances" element 
bars the admission of evidence the defendant would like to 
present regarding the nonexistence of the 1983 ORS); id. at 287 
(in suggesting the device was not feasible, "the defendants may 
not counter with evidence that the 1983 ORS was not in existence 
at the time of manufacture").  In light of such explicit and 
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repetitive language as well as the public policy considerations 
of Pennsylvania,0 we perceive no reason to limit Habecker and 
allow the trial court to consider the nonexistence of a safety 
device. 
 Furthermore, we reject Deere's contention that holding 
a manufacturer liable for failing to place a safety device on a 
product when the safety device did not exist at the time of 
manufacture of the product would impose a "duty to invent" on 
manufacturers.  In Habecker, we stated: 
Pennsylvania's public policy is to encourage 
manufacturers to make their products as safe 
as possible, as soon as possible.  It is the 
jury's prerogative to hold a manufacturer 
responsible for not more aggressively 
researching and implementing safety devices. 
Id. at 286.  This statement reflects Pennsylvania's concerted 
effort to ensure that products that reach its market are as safe 
as possible, and we believe that allowing a manufacturer to 
challenge feasibility of a device by arguing non-existence of the 
device will hinder this goal.  We do not interpret Pennsylvania's 
policy to create a duty for manufacturers to invent or else risk 
being held liable.   
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 We conclude that the district court committed no error 
of law in allowing the case to proceed to the jury, but erred in 
allowing the admission of irrelevant evidence.  Because we 
determine that the evidentiary error was not harmless, we will 
                     
0See discussion below. 
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vacate the judgment of the district court and remand with 
directions for a new trial consistent with this opinion. 
 On remand, the district court must conduct a new trial 
based on the principles as we have described here today and in 
Habecker.  Additionally, unless the district court is provided 
with specific, additional evidence which allows it to make a 
finding that the previous accidents are "substantially similar" 
to the case at bar, all evidence, statistical and otherwise, 
pertaining to prior tractor accidents shall be inadmissible as 
not relevant.  Assuming that Barker lays an adequate foundation 
for the introduction of evidence of rollover accidents, we offer 
the following guidance to the district court to limit the amount 
and detail of this evidence: (1) no evidence regarding the number 
of deaths and injuries due to any of these types of accidents 
shall be admitted; and (2) Barker should not be permitted to 
argue that Deere would have saved an estimated number of lives 
and prevented an estimated number of injuries had it developed an 
OPS for the Deere 620 back in 1956. 
 However, even if the district court is able to conclude 
that any of the accidents are relevant, the court should proceed 
to analyze the evidence under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence to eliminate the danger of unfair prejudice.  Costs 
taxed against appellees. 
       
 
                
